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The Survival of Bashar al-Assad: Geopolitics and the Resilience 
of the Syrian Army 
 
M K Alam 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the history and nature of the Syrian armed forces through its evolution in 
post-colonial era and in particular during the era of Hafez al-Assad. It analyses the history of 
the political events that led to the rise Hafez al-Assad and the ways in which President Assad 
successfully removed sectarianism from the Syrian army. It analyses some of the key figures 
and how they performed along a professional ethos that Assad instilled in the Syrian army. 
The second part of the paper will investigate the arguments relating to the resilience of the 
Syrian army as the only Arab army in non-stop combat mode against the Israeli forces since 
1973, including during the tense period of civil war since 2012. The key battles in the 
Lebanese civil war are also explored and the 2003 invasion of Iraq and how Bashar al-Assad 
inherited a professional army with the sole purpose of guarding against external aggression 
from Iraq, Israel and Lebanon.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Syrian army has been engaged in battle on its own soil for more than four years without 
disintegrating as had been predicted by many commentators. Indeed it is the army of the 
Syrian Arab Republic (al-Jaysh al-’Arabī as-Sūrī) which has kept the state intact. The Syrian 
state institutions of which the army is the foremost guarantor have held firm in the onslaught 
of all the non-state actors as well as regional neighbours. How is it that the Syrian Arab Army 
has held together? The overwhelming factor in this has been that it is not, contrary to what 
most observers argue, an Alawite army. Had it been an Alawite army, it would not have been 
able to hang on for so long. The most prominent Chiefs of Staff and General Staff officers 
have been a combination of Sunni, Christian and Alawite. It has not been built upon sectarian 
lines or ethnic lines. To take its three major contemporary personalities, Mustafa Tlass, Fahd 
Jassem Frejj and the late Daoud Rajiha, they are all respectively Sunni and Greek Orthodox. 
The elder Tlass is now retired, but is the man who shaped the Syrian armed forces with Hafez 
al-Assad in the 1970s. Despite support from Russia and Iran, it is the domestic support and 
resilience of the Syrian Arab Army Officer Corps that has kept the important cities under the 
control of the Ba’ath Party and the Damascus government.  
 
SYRIA ON A MAP 
Most observers point to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 as the defining historical moment 
in the country we now called the Syrian Arab Republic. However perhaps more so than any 
other geographic region in the world, the countries that now make up Syria, Israel, Iraq, 
Lebanon and Jordan have their past, present and future intertwined and the weight of history 
and the relevance of this history is that as the centre of the world’s oldest civilisations and the 
birthplace of the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The 
situation facing Syria today should not be judged by some pre-conceived abstract or concepts 
unrelated to reality, they must be consistent with the facts and within itself, theories must be 
factual, independent and retrospective. In this vein, the paper underlines the importance of 
geopolitics as a toll for understanding the regional strategic conflict and the functioning 
nature of the Syrian army. 
 
SPACE AND UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF SPACE IN THE SYRIAN 
CONTEXT 
One of Britain’s most experienced and best boundary makers, Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich 
asserted that, ‘geographical ignorance may cost us dearly’. Holdich was referring to the 
commission of which he was in charge marking the boundaries of Afghanistan – where it 
started and where it ended. Another geographer and army officer, Colonel Thomas Edward 
Lawrence, who served in a similar context in Syria, was tasked to map where Ottoman Syria 
started and where it ended all the way south to British-controlled Egypt. According to 
Lawrence the statesmen in London and Paris had discounted the geopolitical analysis of the 
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Levant and Mesopotamia. This relationship between geography and international relations 
should be the key to stability in General Karl Haushofer’s view, the repetition of wrongs 
would not lead to a solution; it would only perpetuate conflict and let extreme ideologies 
breathe into the vacuum of lack of thorough geopolitical analysis. These same ideologies 
have taken root since the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the rise and fall of Arab nationalism 
to the birth of Islamic reactionary politics.  
Four historical references are vital in understanding the current conflict in Syria that have 
shaped the psyche of not just contemporary Syrians but the inhabitants in the wider region 
which make up the Levant or belad esSham in Arabic. In the modern era the states of 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Iraq all fall in this category. These states along with 
Turkey remain the ones most affected by the fallout of events currently taking place in Syria. 
To understand the geopolitical nature of the insurgency in Syria, cursory glances at the 
flashpoints of history that have led to the arrival at this critical juncture are essential.  
The first of these is the Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus, which was the first great Arab 
empire which was an imperial state with its capital in Damascus. It was the Umayyad caliph 
Muawiya and his son Yazid who conducted the military operations in modern day Karbala, 
Iraq which massacred Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed. This event divided 
the Arab community and Muslim world to this day and much of the ferment today in 
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq revolves around this incident. The modern entities of the Ba’ath 
party in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Sadrists in Iraq all refer to this point in history for 
their grievances. The actors on the other side of the divide, i.e., the Free Syrian Army, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar view this point as the beginning chapter in the struggle between the Sunni 
and Shia in the Middle East.  
The second point which is vital to understanding current conditions is the Crusades. T. E. 
Lawrence understood this point when he arrived at the Syrian castle, Krak de Chevalier 
which he called the greatest castle in the world. When Lawrence arrived there as a young man 
he was in hostile territory of the Ottomans, and this remains contested territory even today. 
This marked a central strategic point for the knights who came to conquer and hold the Holy 
Land for Christianity: It is a central link of castles across Syria which for three centuries they 
held against the local Muslim population. The size of the stones, and the tens of thousands of 
people that built these forts, and the amount of lives and money, energy and fanaticism 
facilitated this kind of occupation. You could sense at Krak de Chevalier why the Crusades 
are such an astonishing phenomenon even today. It resonates so strongly that al-Qaeda-linked 
insurgents in Iraq used this castle and the Crusades as a reference point to drive out and 
indiscriminately massacre the Christians of Iraq. On the 19
th
 of August 2012, the leading 
Christian priest of Syria, Patriarch of the Church of Antioch, Gregory III called for a rejection 
of the Free Syrian Army, and also sighted how the al-Qaeda linked Iraqi and Syrian 
insurgents had moved into Christian areas by force to draw fire from the regime forces and 
hence endanger the Christian holy places. 
The third historical reference point is that the legacy left behind by Ottoman rule over what 
are now the states of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Israel. Ottoman rule was heavily Sunni and 
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discriminated against the Shia and Alawite minorities of the Levant. When the French moved 
in after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, they favoured these minorities along with the 
Christians and put them in positions of authority. The Sunnis of Syria and Lebanon accuse the 
Christians that they were settlers and supporters of the Crusaders of the 11
th
 century and then 
the colonisers of the 20
th
 century French. In this narrative, the Shia are alleged to have been 
supporters of both, as had been the case with the Ismailis and Alawi support of the Crusaders 
against Saladin along the coast of the Mediterranean. To this day the Shia militias of 
Hezbollah and Sadr curse Saladin annually; Saladin is buried in Damascus, a point not lost on 
the Sunnis who feel humiliated by the ruling sect in Ba’athist Syria.  
The Fourth historically-relevant observation is that of the Sykes-Picot agreement which 
divided the Levant into British and French mandated spheres of influence after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. The Syrian ambassador to the UN, Dr Jaafari, on the 1
st
 of February 2012 
brought up the relevance of this treaty and the insurgency of T.E. Lawrence to today’s 
conflict. He compared the contemporary struggle as similar to that of WWI, when outsiders 
hijacked the legitimate demand of Syrians; he compared the Saudis and Qataris to the fighters 
of the Arab revolt that were paid and directed by the British Army. The ambassador argued 
that like in Versailles and Lausanne, this conflict was being decided in Doha, Riyadh and 
Ankara.  
 
HISTORY, ETHNICITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SYRIAN ARMY 
However to understand how the Syria Army got to where it is today one has to delve into the 
history of the Syrian state since independence and understand how its military has shaped the 
state. Since March 1949 Syria has experienced sixteen military coups, nine of which were 
successful in overthrowing the incumbent rulers. The army had never really retreated into the 
barracks until the arrival of Hafez al-Assad. After independence from the French, Syria had 
eight years of parliamentary rule (1945-149) and (1954-1958), but after March 1963 members 
of the armed forces that were sympathetic to the Arab Socialist Party intervened to bring their 
version of parliamentary rule backed by a strong military presence to Syria.
1
 Arguably, this 
military-Ba’th faction that has ruled Syria for the last four decades has not been an all-out 
dictatorship and owes its success to a combination of balance between rural and urban Syria, 
mercantile and tribal Syria, and the political families that were aligned to elements of the 
armed forces which influenced the Syrian state since its inception whether these families 
being leftists, Nasserites, pan-Arabists or business focussed.
2
 The divergent business interests 
and feudal family politics converged on the armed forces to keep a strong stable Syria that 
could leverage itself over Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.
3
  
Whilst the French had only encouraged the non-Arabs and non-Muslims to join the army in 
mandate-Syria, the departure of the French changed this situation dramatically. The Homs 
and Hama military academies took Sunnis of all backgrounds and it was Sunnis that made up 
the majority of the army elite in the 1970s and 1980s. According to Patrick Seale, the Syrian 
army under Adib Shishakli, became an “unashamedly political instrument”.4 However it had 
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done away with its mostly French policies of sectarian divisions within the army, under Hafez 
al-Assad this policy continued and a mixture of all classes and sects continued to join the 
army. Al-Assad did however begin the process of depoliticising the Syrian armed forces.  
The Syrian army had always bridged the gap and the friction between the rural and urban 
centres of Syria and the rich and the poor.
5
 In this regard, it will be interesting to take a closer 
look at some of the ethnicity and religions of key figures that shaped the Syrian armed forces 
in the run up to the takeover by Hafez al Assad. Colonel Haydar al-Kuzbari was a Sunni who 
played a key role in ending the union between Egypt and Syria. General Abdel Karim 
Zahareddine was a Druze Chief of Staff of the armed forces and took over affairs once Syria 
had firmly established itself away from Egypt’s grasp. Ziad al-Harriri was a Sunni head of the 
army and defence minister in 1963. Amin al-Hafez was another Sunni head of army and 
president – a Ba’athist who crushed the Sunni uprising in Hama in 1964 through aerial 
bombings which included attacks on mosques. Here it can be noted almost twenty years 
before Hafez al-Assad’s raid on Hama, a Sunni head of army and atate in the shape of Amin 
al-Hafez had used overwhelming force to crush an Islamist-led uprising. Furthermore, in 
1952 another Hama rebellion was crushed by Sunni officers under a Sunni officer from 
Hama, Adib Shishakli.
6
 Mustafa Tlass himself testifies to the non-sectarian nature of the 
armed forces in the role he played in crushing three Hama rebellions by the Syrian armed 
forces spread over three decades.
7
 Abdel Karim al-Nahlwai, another officer who played an 
instrumental role in Damascus’ decision to bring Syria out of Egypt’s clutches was also a 
Sunni.  
The Ba’athists had taken the mantle of educating the army officers throughout the 1970s,8 and 
since then the Syrian military has ruled through a praetorian-patrimonial model rather than an 
outright parliamentary executive power. The army had to adapt from not just being a military 
force but also the political guardian of the country. Assad turned the military into a unified 
force and set about professionalising the army and ironically at the same time managed the 
chaos of Lebanon which was completely based on sectarian fault lines.
9
 There were as many 
inter-Alawi intrigues as non-Alawi.
10
 The Syrian army lost its monopoly on political power 
during the regime of President Hafiz al-Assad as he knew how to control the armed forces. As 
Hinnebusch has also noted, sectarianism and ethnicity have never been the driving features of 
the Syrian military.
11
 Indeed, in his famous book, The Policy of Social Change in the Middle 
East and North Africa, Manfred Halpern presented the officers’ corps as representing the new 
salaried middle class that emerged in the Arab world as the result of the modernisation 
process. This class also includes teachers, administrators in the civil service and government 
apparatus, technicians, high school and university professors, journalists, lawyers and others. 
These observations help, at least in part, in understanding the Ba’ath revolution.12 
The Ba’ath party has continued to provide an ideological and organisational base common to 
all the forces which play a role in Syrian politics: The bureaucrats of the party, government 
and civil service, as well as senior army officers. It has branches in the army units and 
security forces, which send representatives to the senior party institutions. And senior 
members of the armed forces are members in such institutions as the Central Committee al 
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Lajna al-Markaziyya) and Regional Command (al-Qiyada al-Qutriyya), alongside party 
bureaucrats.
13
 
To further demonstrate the non-sectarian nature of the Syrian military high command one 
must also look at a pivotal moment which defines the Syrian military to this day in the midst 
of the civil war. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there was tremendous external pressure on 
Syria, none more so than from Iraq, Israel and Egypt. All three threats were different: Egypt 
wanted to subdue Syria through the guise of the Arab Union Republic. Iraq and its Ba’ath 
wing were supporting several different factions within Syria in order to bring its party and 
military under their own control; and Israel was and still remains in a state of war with Syria. 
Amidst all this there were the coups and counter coups within the military and government. 
Hafez al-Assad and Mustafa Tlass decided that given the external threats, the military, above 
all, must have a nationalist agenda and an institution devoid of politics.
14
 It was this strategy, 
developed by Tlass and Assad, which led to near complete purge of politics from the military 
and a separation of power, not seen before in Syria. 
Hafez al-Assad also brought in senior members of the Syrian air force into the military high 
command. Naji Jamil (Sunni) served as Air Force Commander from 1970 to 1978 and was 
promoted to General Staff committee overseeing defences on the Iraq border. Another Air 
Force Commander, Mohammed al-Khuli, was until 1993 controlled the coveted logistic 
positions between Damascus and Lebanon. These last commanders at the top at the time of 
Hafez al-Assad’s death included the Air Force Security Administration headed by Ibrahim 
Huwayji, non-air force commanders Hasan Khalil, Ali Duba, Ali Mamlouk and Hikmat 
Shihabi.
15
 Other prominent officers above the rank of Brigadier in military and civil defence 
positions post-2000 are Sunnis, including Rustum Ghazaleh, Hazem al-Khadra and Deeb 
Zaytoun. Since 1973 the strategic tank battalions of the 70
th
 armoured brigade stationed near 
al-Kiswah (near Damascus) have had rank and file Alawis under command of Sunni 
officers.
16
 
By the time Hafez al-Assad passed on the army to his son Bashar, the Syrian military had 
firmly lost its sectarian beginnings which were very much a legacy of French colonial rule. 
The deft play between rural and urban, tribal and religious sects was evened out through an 
education system played on party lines rather than religion. The stage had also been set for 
the removal of military officers from main stream politics. Instead, the family structure of 
Syria would be co-opted into the party whilst the army would remain stable and neutral. In 
contrast, few Arab countries have armies based on professionalism; most are based on tribal 
structure, importance of family lineage and religion. In Syria, the last forty years have shown 
that the army is not a sectarian military force. Most of the internal politics within the army 
had been rooted out with power and promotion and performance in the field. Even during the 
most critical time of the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a good balance of Sunni and 
Alawi officers.
17
 Interestingly, not all the Alawis supported Salah Jadid whilst prominent 
Sunni officers such as Lietuenal Colonel Ahmad Suwaydani from Houran supported Jadid.
18
 
The most promising test came when Hafez al-Assad lay sick and his brother tried to make a 
move for power. Hafez categorically left day to day affairs of the state in the hands of an all 
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Sunni cast, with Mustafa Tlass, Abdallah al-Ahmar, Hikmat Shihabi, Abd al-Rauf al Kasm 
and Zuhayr Mashariqah in charge. Furthermore, prominet Alawis at the time such as Ali 
Hayder, Ibrahim Safi and Ali Douba decided not to side with Rifaat al-Assad despite his 
offers of shared power.
19
  
 
COUNTER-INSURGENCY LESSONS  
As we witness the Syrian army battle its way to victory in key towns such as Qusayr and 
Yabroud, along with making strategic gains in Aleppo and the suburbs of Damascus, it is 
again important to look at how and where the Syrian military honed its fighting skills.  
The Syrian army, along with its military and civilian intelligence forces, has mastered the art 
of dividing its opponent (insurgent) unlike any other army. Syria dominated Lebanon for 
decades not through brute force but cunning power plays and an understanding of geography 
and history. Take into account the three contemporary battles of Qusayr, Yabroud and 
Maloula. All three hold their strategic and symbolic values: Two were the supply route 
towards Lebanon and the Mediterranean as well as being great vantage points, whilst the 
other is the most important Christian town for Arabs along with Bethlehem. In Maloula, the 
local residents joined in the fighting alongside of the Syrian army against the rebels. This 
meant clearing the area of the foreign insurgents. This a tactic right out of the Syrian army’s 
days of operating in Lebanon, where they cleared areas with the tacit approval of local people 
whether they were Christian, Sunni or Shia. In Qusayr, despite the presence of Hezbollah, it 
was the Syrian army that did the bulk of the fighting. Hezbollah were only there to protect the 
Shia villages on the Lebanese side, and then they crossed into Syria to protect Shia civilians. 
These successes demonstrated how the Syrian army units were always imbedding locals into 
their operations. But the roots of these modern battles lay in the Syrian army’s performance in 
Lebanon in the 1980s. 
Looking back on the Lebanese experience, Syria formed its policies on the premise that 
Israel’s main political objective for going into Lebanon was to crush the PLO, in which it 
succeeded with overwhelming odds and ease in the 1980s. However, its second objective of 
removing Syria’s military presence in the Bekaa valley and reduce its influence in Lebanon 
was its greatest and only failure since its birth in 1948.
20
 The Israeli plan for Lebanon to 
combat Syria called for the seizing of Lebanese territory up to and  including Beirut,  which 
would be taken in a coordinated operation with the Phalange  forces;  an advance beyond the 
Beirut-Damascus highway, which would cut off Beirut from the main Syrian forces;  and  the 
expulsion  of  Syrian  units from the Bekaa  valley.  One would expect that this plan would 
entail deep penetrations, landings north of Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus highway, and 
other tactical manoeuvres of the type espoused in IDF doctrine. Syria’s ability to counter 
Israel’s strategic objectives provides lessons for understanding the battles the Syrian military 
has been involved in since the start of the civil war. Indeed, a careful analysis of key strategic 
battles between the Israelis and the Syrians will help in explaining the Syrian army’s 
performance in recent years.  
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In 1982 the Syrian presence in Lebanon had diminished from three divisions in 1976 to one 
division and one mixed brigade which amounted to 30,000 men.  The 1st Armoured Division 
in the Bekaa, commanded by Rifaat al-Assad was deployed in defensive positions in depth.  
Both Syrian formations and doctrine followed the Soviet model, and defensive doctrine called 
for combined-arms operations, combat teams whose structure was fixed in advance, and a 
defence based on massive firepower. To provide firepower, the Syrians depended on air 
defence in depth by various SAM sites reinforced by anti-aircraft guns, and a ground defence 
force characterised by a profusion of anti-tank weapons and units. The defence would depend 
on intensive fortifications and exploitation of natural obstacles to a depth of 20-30 kilometres. 
The 85th Brigade was deployed in the Beirut area in an armed presence role, with the 
additional task of securing the Beirut-Damascus highway. 
In addition to the main armies of Syria and Israel, Lebanese militias would become involved 
in the fighting. The Israelis expected the Christian Lebanese Forces, some 10,000 strong, to 
fight as allies against the PLO. As war neared, the opponents consisted of some seven 
divisions and two independent brigades of the IDF, 60,000-78,000 strong, arrayed against 
15,000 PLO fighters, one Syrian armoured division, and one Syrian brigade. The main battle 
at the end of the war was how well the Syrian and Israelis would manage their allies in the 
form of irregular forces. The main battles of 10 June, 1982 were fought in the Eastern Sector, 
between the IDF and the Syrian 1st Armoured Division. Ground Syrian resistance had been 
stiff. The Syrians defended a series of strong points along the winding roads. Each 
strongpoint conducted a separate, integrated defence with obstacles, mines, tanks, and 
commandos using Saggers and RPGs; at times, such as in the defence of the crossroads near 
Lake Qaraoun, the defence was supported by artillery and by Gazelle helicopters using HOT 
missiles.    
At dawn, Syria commandos attacked. IDF APCs and tanks were hit and caught fire and men 
were killed trying to rescue the wounded from burning vehicles. Finally, Brigadier 
Menachem Einan ordered a cessation of rescue attempts and the column retreated in reverse 
gear. 
Around  23:00,  this  force approached  Ein Zhalta,  some eight kilometres from  the  Beirut- 
Damascus  highway  but  more  than 20 by  road.  Unknown  to  the Israelis,  the area around 
Ein Zhalta was defended by a  brigade-strength  Syrian  force  consisting  of a  few  dozen  
tanks  and commando units.  After passing through the villages, the Israelis started 
descending a steep slope with tanks in the lead when the Syrians opened tire with tanks from 
the opposite ridge and RPGs and Saggers from the surrounding wadis. The Israeli attacks on 
Syrian positions in the Bekaa brought Syrian reaction in the west. There, Syrian forces had 
remained in Beirut and out of the fighting, but now the 85th Brigade began to deploy tank and 
commando teams south and east of  Beirut – around Khalde and the hills south of Beirut and 
along the Shemlan ridge  area. 
In June 1982 the Israeli Air Force had jammed and destroyed the Syrian radar and bombed 
the surface-to-air missiles (SAM) sites in the Bekaa valley. However despite the 
overwhelming odds they Syrian army fought on; the Israeli charge from the south was 
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checked with ferocity when the IDF came into contact with Syrian positions. The IDF 
reported heavy obstacles inch for inch. An IDF armoured column was halted in a fierce tank 
battle in the village of Sultan Yacoub. This prevented the Israelis from taking the vitally 
strategic Beirut-Damascus highway that cut across the Bekaa valley.
21
 The IDF was also 
halted towards the southern approach to Beirut at Khalde. The Syrian army backed different 
groups to obstruct the Israeli advance east of Beirut.
22
 Al-Saiqa fighters and other Shia- Sunni 
groups backed by regular units form the Syrian army fought the IDF to a standstill in 1983. 
The Israelis retreated to the Litani river, and aimed to avoid contact with the Syrian forces at 
all cost.  
These battles would be forgotten in Western military literature but for the Syrians today and 
their General Staff officers they formed the basis for the next war with Israel through 
irregular forces. Hence the performance of the Syrian forces today is a culmination of the 
study of the 1980s battles which joined irregulars with the main Syrian army. Syria never 
suffered from lack of courage or will to fight on.
23
 Even though they knew they could not 
stand up to IAF in 1982 they flew near suicide missions with great commitment and skill.
24
 
The American appraisal of Syrian troops summarised that the Syrians had returned to Beirut 
after the withdrawal of the Israelis, but they were no more able to establish order than were 
the Americans and Israelis before them. Nevertheless, it may be that the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon will prove so important as to standout as the one thing which prevented any radical 
change to Lebanon’s form of government, for despite Syrian support for Iran in its conflict 
with Iraq, Syria had no interest in seeing a Shia Islamic government in Lebanon and would 
rather maintain some form of the status quo. The Americans saw Syria as the only party with 
whom they could deal with concerning Lebanon and that situation was better served than 
having factional anarchy for the Israelis as well, as of course for the Lebanese population 
too.
25
  
 
SYRIAN ARMY AS A NON-CONVENTIONAL FORCE 
Similar to the American assessment of the Syrian army control of Lebanon was that of the 
Israelis. The Israeli government came to the conclusion that they had nothing to gain in 
destabilising Syria under Assad; in the end it would likely bring a Sunni Islamic government 
to power. It would be more of a war in which there shall not be a zero sum option but rather 
in which both sides lose relative ground and the ability to operate.
26
 After arguably being out 
done in Lebanon by Syrian forces and its proxies, the Israelis now saw the wisdom of letting 
Syria have hegemony to maintain the status quo of the Golan Heights. This doctrine was 
further entrenched after the 2006 war in Lebanon. 
In the aftermath of the 33-day war in 2006, Syria sent commandos and artillery units to the 
border and the IDF raised its level of military readiness to the maximum in ten years and 
doubled its deployment on Mount Hermon.
27
 Syria had also doubled its commando units in 
2007 and started preparing for urban guerrilla warfare training.
28
 One of the 12 divisions of 
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Syrian army was made of 10,000 elite commandos and the same unit doubled the number of 
rockets in its possession.
29
  
Taking the longer time in mind, Israel had to accept that the Syrian forces had made 
surprising advances against the Israelis in the Golan in 1973 and resisted the Israeli advances 
in Lebanon in 1982.
30
 The assumption that the power and effectiveness of the Syrian military 
had been corrupted so as not to able it to mount any sort of fighting force proved misplaced. 
More than anything, the Syrian forces’ helicopters proved significantly proficient and their 
commando units effective in absorbing mechanised frontal assaults by the IDF. The 
remarkable success gained by Hezbollah in 2006 confirmed the transition of Syrian forces 
from a conventional fighting force to one capable of undertaking asymmetric warfare, and the 
irregular forces which it had trained proved able to compensate for the conventional 
superiority of the IDF and its vulnerability to irregular warfare techniques.
31
   
The Israeli strategic expert Ephraim Inbar remarked: “in the recent strategic acumen of the 
Syrian military Israel has absolute superiority in several fields in warfare so Syria is investing 
in fields where it can have an edge. It has invested in recent years in anti aircraft weapons 
rockets missiles and bunkers. The war in Lebanon proved to the Syrians that they were right 
to do so”.32  
The grudging respect the Israelis have had for the Syrian armed forces trumps all other armies 
in the region with respect to threats to Israel. Israel not only saw the importance of the 
irregular forces that Syria could unleash but also the negative consequences of removing the 
Syrian state and army from the Lebanese theatre. Israel of course had long considered the 
domestic consequences of political change in Syria and when Silvan Shalom, the Israeli 
foreign minister in 2004, suggested to Ariel Sharon to adopt a strategy of destabilisation of 
the Syrian regime, Sharon replied by saying that would merely result in an extremist Sunni 
government emerging in Syria, or an unstable democracy, both of which would be a threat to 
Israel’s security.33  
Upon the death of Hafez al-Assad, Vice President Abd-al Halim Khaddam, serving as 
temporary acting president, promulgated two decrees, first announcing the appointment of 
Bashar al-Assad, the late president's son, as the General Commander of the Syrian armed 
forces, in addition to  his being promoted to the rank of Fariq, the  most senior rank which his 
father had held. Just hours later and in a public show of support, Bashar received members of 
the senior officers’ corps, headed by Defence Minister Mustafa Tlas and Chief of the General 
Staff (CGS) Ali Aslan who came to offer their condolences on the death of his father, as well 
pledging their loyalty and complete support for their new military leader. Again to return to a 
topic mentioned earlier in this paper, were the Syrian Armed Forces a sectarian unit it would 
make sense the Sunni Tlass to provoke trouble. However it was the two main Sunnis in the 
regime namely Khaddam and Tlass that oversaw the smooth transition of power to Bashar al-
Assad.  
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CONCLUSION 
If a Lebanese woman gets pregnant they say the Syrians did it, if a bird falls out from the sky 
over Beirut it is said to have been attacked by the Syrian eagle.
34
 Of course the eagle and the 
lion have come to symbolise the Levant for the last four decades in the shape of the Syrian 
state built by Hafez al-Assad, and the one being kept alive by his son Bashar. What has come 
to motivate the Syrian armed forces and state to resist all that has been thrown at it in the last 
few years? The answer, in my assessment, lies in the formidable network built by Hafez al-
Assad’s army in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. This is the very same network we have seen at 
play in Iraq post-2003 and in Lebanon post-1976. As former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger famously remarked “you can't make war in the Middle East without Egypt and you 
can't make peace without Syria”.  
As commentators in 2015 struggle to make sense of Syria and its regime, few have bothered 
to look at the performance of the Syrian forces in Lebanon post-1976. It is noteworthy that it 
was a great relief to the Americans and the Israelis that the Syrian army sanctioned by the 
Arab League marched into Lebanon in 1976 on behalf of the Christian community there to 
fight the anarchist Palestinians who had earlier destabilised Jordan and were doing the same 
in Lebanon. It was the Syrian army that along with Israel had a tacit agreement that anything 
north of the Litani river belonged to the Syrian sphere of influence and the rest to Israel. So 
we move to the 80s and 90s and Syria becomes the guarantor of peace in not just Lebanon but 
also the greater Levant region. How the Syrian army and intelligence forces skilfully played 
off one group against the other in Lebanon to bring about their mastery over the country and 
then replayed the same in Iraq post-2003 is indeed worth remembering. In Iraq, Syria’s armed 
forces and intelligence officers successfully outwitted the coalition forces and indeed Iran in 
backing the Sunni insurgents who came to fight from the north and east of Syria. At the same 
time, the Syrians maintained excellent relations with the Shia Sadr brigades based in southern 
Iraq.  
This was the same Syrian military that throughout the 1970s and 1980s kept a precarious 
balance between different Lebanese Christian families of Chamoun, Gemayael and Frangieh. 
This is the same Syrian military that for years actually ideologically supported the moderate 
Amal party of the Shias and not Hezbollah. The greatest Christian general of Lebanon, 
Michel Aoun, who was the quintessentially anti-Syrian of the 1990s, became the Syrians’ 
biggest ally following Syrian withdrawal in 2005. Put simply, when Aoun bothered the 
Syrians, they simply backed other Christian warlords in Mount Lebanon and thus fragmented 
the Lebanese Christians, and as a result came out on top.  
So the dexterity displayed at deflecting all allegations of assassinations and being the root 
cause for all problems in Lebanon and Iraq have served the Syrian army well in the ongoing 
conflict in Syria. In analysing these significant episodes can we understand the Syrian army’s 
policy of ‘no vanquished and no conqueror’. As we see the drift of the Syrian rebels into 
splinter groups of hundreds of factions, and even reports of how the Syrian army pays al-
Nusra for the flow of oil, it is a lesson all too familiar for those who have watched the 
Machiavellian politics of the Syrian military establishment at work. Reports of Farouk Sharaa 
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and Ali Habib’s defections have now been proven to be fabricated. The chess played in the 
Levant first termed as the ‘Syrian belt’ by Seymour Hersh is one whose actors are the Syrian 
security forces. From Mount Lebanon to Damascus, there is a history of Syrian state and 
army at work on the ground. Alan George in his book concludes that although the hopes of 
reform invested in the young President Bashar al-Assad were probably exaggerated, “he 
might yet succeed in launching a programme of limited political reform if the west, through 
support for an aggressive Israel and swaggering threats against Syria, does not perpetuate the 
conditions that allowed the most anti-democratic wing of the Syrian regime to prevail over 
the pro-democracy activists”.35 Arguably with the coming of the conflict to Syria Bashar al-
Assad did not have sufficient time to continue what he started in 2000, namely the gradual 
reform process that many in the West witnessed up close between 2000 and 2010.
36
 The 
Syrian military has evolved into a unified non-sectarian force and while many observers point 
to undoubted prowess of Hezbollah in the battlefield it is worth noting, as this paper does, 
that it had been the Syrian forces which had been the main force facing Israel for years.
37
 The 
Syrian army remains a formidable force, despite huge internal and external pressures. It has 
evolved as an institution to outlast sectarian fault lines and negative foreign influences.
38
 
Before ISIL had caught the attention of Western headlines, the Syrian Air Force was the first 
to strike out against them at least four months before Western airstrikes.
39
 The Iraqi prime 
minister publicly expressed as far back as June stated his gratitude to Syria for coming to the 
aid of encircled Iraqis in the north and west of the country.
40
 This was at the time when the 
United States had apparently balked at the idea of the delivering the F-16 fighter jets that Iraq 
had already paid for. The Air War had been raging in Iraq well before it caught the attention 
of NATO powers. Arguably, for reasons discussed, there is only one credible fighting force 
on the ground that is capable of confronting and defeating ISIL and that is the Syrian military.  
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ʻAskarīyah, 2000,  pp 527-529  
8
 Ben-Tzur, Avraham. The Neo-Ba’th Party of Syria, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 
3, No.3, 1968, pp 161-182 
9
 Drysdale, Alasdair. Ethnicity in the Syrian Officer Corps : A Conceptualization, 
Civilisations, Vol. 29, No. 3/4, 1979, pp 364-367 
10
 Ibid. pp 372-372 
11
 Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (197b), "Local Politics in Syria: Organization and Mobilization 
in Four Village Cases", Middle East Journal, 30, 1-24 
12
 Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1963  
13
 Zisser, Eyal. Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 
2001)  
14
 Van, Dam Nikolas. The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and 
the Ba'th Party. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011, p 63 
15
 Cordesman, Anthony H. Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War, 
CSIS, Washington D.C., August 15 2007 p 141-144 
16
 Hurewitz, J.C. Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension. Boulder: Westview Press, 
1982, p 153  
17
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